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SUMMARY 
Institutional arrangements are key drivers of the use of common-pool resources (CPR). The analysis 
of existing arrangements requires a framework that allows research to describe a case study 
systematically and diagnose the institutional setting. Based on a sound understanding of current 
institutions the question of what effects alternate arrangements would have becomes evident. This 
step requires a predictive model, which can either be qualitative or, preferably, analyses an empirical 
case quantitatively. A major conceptual challenge of a quantitative model is the evolution of rules, 
which define the boundaries for the agents to choose strategies. This paper develops the conceptual 
foundations for such a modelling approach and an agent-based model for the analysis of institutional 
arrangements in a CPR setting. 
KEY WORDS 
multi-agent simulation, agent-based modelling, institutional arrangements, common-pool resources 
CLASSIFICATION 
JEL: C61, O13, Q19 
 
Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model 
57 
INTRODUCTION 
Land-use includes different interests, especially, if common-pool resources are involved. 
Common-pool resources are often confronted with the threat of being overused because they 
are defined by a low excludability of users and high subtractability of use. In situations where 
multiple users have access to the resource, individual behaviour determines if a resource is 
used in a viable way. Incentives for individual behaviour are defined by so-called institutional 
arrangements, including markets as sources for incentives as well as boundaries for 
individual decisions. These behavioural regularities [52, p.19] evolve from and depend on 
several drivers such as environmental conditions. The context of multiple-use can have a 
significant impact on the use of common-pool resources as a diversity of interests is linked 
with the common-pool resources, partly preserving and partly exploiting them. 
The elements of an institutional arrangement are linked by a complex system. Perturbations 
like environmental shocks or exogenous changes in statutory law affect these arrangements, 
as the system must adapt to the new conditions. The aim of this paper is to describe how a 
predictive tool can be developed in order to evaluate the impact of such changes in 
institutional arrangements. This tool aims to simulate the use of common-pool resources in 
the context of multiple-use. 
Section 2 discusses common-pool resources in the context of multiples-use. Section 3 gives 
an overview of the theoretical work on institutional arrangements, followed by section 4, 
where the individual dimension of agents and their adaptation process is discussed. Section 5 
analyses the impact of links between individual, while section 6 brings the individual agents 
and their links together in a systems perspective and analyses the adapting dynamics of the 
structure. In section 7 agent-based models are specified for four games and the results of the 
scenarios are discussed. Section 8 draws conclusions from this work. 
This paper is an updated version of a paper presented at the Tenth Conference of the 
International Association for the Study of Common Property (held in Oaxaca - Mexico, 
August 9-13, 2004). 
MULTIPLE USE IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 
This paper is focused on land use in the outback of Australia. Land can be used in different 
ways, from planting crops, over grazing cattle to pure transportation purposes. If a resource, 
in this case land, is used for different purposes (at the same time) we have a multiple use 
context. A multiple user context is defined if more than one person uses the resource for the 
same purpose. Multiple user scenarios are widely discussed and common-pool resources 
(CPR) are defined for multiple user situations. Generally, goods and resources can be 
categorised for subtractability and possibilities to exclude others, see [52, p.7]. Common-pool 
resources are of special interest because excluding others is difficult and subtractibility is high. 
The case of multiple use and CPR is not in the focus of current literature although the 
pressure on a CPR, described in the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ [27] or in ‘Governing the 
Commons’ [51], can include very different dynamics considering multiple use options. This 
paper will analyse the connection of multiple use opportunities and CPR in section 7 with the 
example of privately owned land that is used for grazing. On this block of land is a gorge that 
contains an archaeologically important fossil site but which is also water source for cattle and 
a popular site for four-wheel driving. The fossil site can be identified as a CPR. Additionally, 
as tourists increase income in the community, a pool of interested tourists becomes a CPR. 
Businesses in the community can use this CPR to generate income and the rancher can use 
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this pool by keeping them away, as four-wheel drivers reduce the productivity of his cattle by 
scaring them away from the gorge. Therefore, this paper includes a renewable resource 
(potential tourists) and a non-renewable resource (fossils) as CPRs and combines this with 
multiple-use of privately owned land. The land owner, the community businesses, and the 
tourism operators act as individuals. All agents form together with the resource and the 
institutional arrangement the system. 
In order to analyse institutional arrangements in the context of multiple use I first develop the 
theoretical background of institutional arrangements. After that I will focus on individuals 
and learning as their dynamic dimension, followed by the system in an evolutionary game-
theoretical approach. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC 
THEORY 
Institutional issues were for a long time not part of economic research as the main problems 
allowed a broad aggregation of economic entities and activities. Neo-classical approaches 
focused on the understanding of the fundamental context of market mechanisms and market 
results. For this reason these scholars were able to make restrictive assumptions about human 
behaviour. The rationally acting homo oeconomicus with perfect information dominated 
economic research. Young [67] puts the focus of neoclassical theory in a way that 
“Neoclassical economics describes the way the world looks once the dust has settled; we are 
interested in how the dust goes about settling.” In other words, the world does not switch 
from one general equilibrium to the next; transitions exist, dust exists. These evolving 
interests changed the focus from this principle of general equilibria as an attractor towards 
institutional aspects. Nowadays institutional theories provide some of the most important 
approaches used to explain economic issues. 
This development commenced with Coase [11] where the idea of transaction costs was 
introduced. Coase [12] and Hayek [30] improved the conceptual foundation to consider 
institutions in economic research. Since then several disciplines have had an important 
impact on the direction of institutional economics, namely philosophy, political science, and 
social science. While the New Institutional Economics provided a solid theoretical 
framework for the understanding of institutions and transaction costs the focus shifted 
towards possibilities of applying this work. This shift paved the way particularly towards 
(evolutionary) game-theoretic approaches. 
Coase [11] begins with the organisation of market processes and addresses the question as to 
why companies organise some of their activities inside (‘make’ position) and others outside 
(‘buy’ position) of their organisational structure. Coase uses the existence and importance of 
transaction costs and institutions to explain the real world and stimulating economic research 
in a significant way. Williamson [65] structures Coase work in a very useful way: In his 
paper ‘The Nature of the Firm’ [11] Coase focuses on institutions of governance, which can 
be called the play of the game, while his paper ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ [12] analyses 
the institutional environment, the rules of the game. 
Williamson [64] focuses on transaction costs and distinguishes between Institutional 
Economics (eg. Commons, 1931) and New Institutional Economics. He comes to the 
conclusion that “any relation, economic or otherwise, that takes the form of or can be 
described as a contracting problem, can be evaluated to advantage in transaction cost 
economic terms.” [64, p.387]. Therefore, according to Williamson all actions between 
different parties can be seen as transactions and these transactions result in costs. 
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Transaction costs have to be seen in connection with the rules those transaction follow, see [65]. 
North [47] defines institutions as “rules of a game of a society or formally [institutions] are 
the human-devised constraints that structure human interaction.” These rules can be formal, 
like statute law, common law and regulations, informal, like conventions, norms of behaviour 
or codes of conduct, or they can incorporate “the enforcement characteristics of both” [48]. 
Institutions exist because of the need to reduce transaction costs. This means the lower 
transaction costs are the more efficient institutions work [48]. The institutional framework 
defines the constraints for the maximisation of an organisation’s economic performance. 
Institutional change can be a result of changes in formal rules or informal constraints. North [46] 
defines five propositions about institutional change: 
 The key for institutional change is the interaction between institutions and organisations in 
a competitive setting. 
 To survive in this competitive setting organisations have to invest in skills and knowledge. 
 The institutional setting provides incentives that dictate the kinds of skills and knowledge 
perceived to have the maximum pay-off. 
 Perceptions are derived from the mental constructs of the players. 
 Economics of scope, complementarities, and network externalities of an institutional 
matrix make institutional change overwhelming incremental and path dependent. 
In this approach organisations are groups of individuals, see [47], and can be political bodies, 
economic bodies, social bodies, or educational bodies. As mentioned previously, competition 
is a crucial aspect for the development of institutions. “While learning is a result of curiosity, 
the rate of learning will reflect the intensity of competition amongst organisations.” [47, p.6]. 
The concept of learning will play a critical role in a later stage of this paper. In addition, 
North [45, 49] emphasises the importance of path dependency: Whereby the Cultural heritage 
and the specific historical experience of the economy determines institutional change. 
“Changing merely the formal rules will produce the desired results only when the informal 
norms are complementary to that rule change, and enforcement is either perfect or at least 
consistent with the expectations of those altering the rules.” [49, p.3]. 
Williamson [64] identifies three variables as the main drivers for transaction costs: asset-
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. These variables provide two essential drivers for 
another research field within the area of institutional economics: the focus on property rights 
and contracts. The fact that asset-specific investment decisions have to be made under 
uncertainty leads to the possibility of investment protection. These drivers are highly relevant 
because in most cases information is unequally distributed; one party has more information 
than the other one. This leads to a closer view on contracts, see, for instance [66]. In order for 
it to be feasible to have different possibilities to securing investment we must assume that 
there are visible differences in owning property and the kind of rights, which are connected to 
this ownership. Other authors [1, 2, 16] founded the basis for property rights theory. 
Demsetz [16] states that “property rights specify how persons may be benefited and harmed, 
and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the actions taken by persons.” With this 
definition he develops the concept of distinguishing the need for property rights from that of 
the existence of externalities. This allowed him[16] to develop a dynamic definition of 
property rights as they change in order to minimise externalities in a dynamic environment. 
These externalities can be seen in an inter- or intra-generational perspective, similar to the 
concept of sustainable development. If the community owns the property, it is possible that 
present generations overuse the connected resources and future generations are 
underrepresented in decisions about the intensity of use. In addition, the presence of multiple-
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users can increase transaction costs in a dramatic way, especially by creating free rider 
problems (see [2]), and undermining negotiations about the optimal use. 
At the same time however, private property can cause various investments to not be 
undertaken if they are outside the range of the perspective of an individual. The greater the 
numbers of private owners, the higher transaction costs are to arrange investment that 
increases the overall benefit. Property rights will be modified over time in such a way so that 
“negotiating and policing costs will be compared to costs that depend on the scale of 
ownership, and parcels of land will tend to be owned in sizes which minimize the sum of 
these costs.” [16, p.358]. These aspects are considered in [2] from another perspective, 
whereby the value of an organisational structure is equated with the transaction costs it saves. 
This approach corresponds with Coase’s [11] initial theory about the fact that for the 
existence of transaction costs (different) organisations exist. 
The theoretical discussion provides the understanding of institutions. An applied analysis of a 
real-world case requires not only the ability to analyse a situation qualitatively but also a base 
for a simulative capacity with which to evaluate effects of changes [59]. This simulative 
dimension is covered by different quantitative approaches. For instance, Johnson, Kaufman 
and Zoido-Lobatón [38], Hellman and Kaufmann [33] or Beck et al. [4] use econometric 
instruments to work on different elements of institutional arrangements in order to measure 
the quality of institutions. Another approach is the modification of game-theoretic approaches 
for institutional issues. In this paper we will focus on agent-based models. Before we develop 
the game-theoretical framework for our model we discuss in the following section the question 
about how to model individuals and their behaviour as defining agents in a game is a crucial step. 
MICRO-LEVEL: INDIVIDUALS ADAPT BY LEARNING 
The field of constitutional economics is related to political economics, public choice theory 
or public law and implements the normative perspective on market behaviour and results. A 
core question is, as cited above, “Why do persons choose rules that seem to constrain or limit 
their choices?” [8]. Rawls [54] developed the theory of justice as fairness, used in the first 
framework of this research field, by analysing the normative perspective of action choice. 
Normative means that there is a perception about ethically right and wrong behaviour that is 
mainly defined by Rawls’ criterion of reciprocity: 
“Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system 
of cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms 
of social cooperation... and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of 
their own interests in particular situations, provided that others also accept those 
terms. For those terms to be fair terms, citizens offering them must reasonably 
think that those citizens to whom they are offered might also reasonably accept 
them.” [55, p.XLIV]. 
This approach has to be seen in a tradition of Kant who founded the theory regarding the 
deduction of ethical principles from rationality. On this theoretical basis stands also the 
Frankfurt School of thought, with popular representatives like Luhman, who founded the 
system theory, and Adorno and Habermas. This German scholar emphasises the difference 
between action as individual behaviour and rules or, as Homann [36] defines it, between the 
constitutive and the operational level. Economic incentives only determine rules directly and 
not the action of an individual which underlies in this approach strictly the rules. This means 
that individual behaviour is bound to rules and as they are complementary to economic 
incentives, the rules are self enforcing. The reliability of individual behaviour is therefore not 
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given by the moral commitment of the individuum as Kant defined, but by the definition of 
complementary rules, see [36]. 
This approach implements the same mechanism the game theoretical approach develops and 
states, as Hobbes points out in Leviathan, that a rule can only be enforced if all parties accept 
the rule. This theory confirms the context of path dependency described in [49], mentioned 
above. As Homann states [36], the normative validity of a rule depends on sufficient 
implementation and it is the implementation, which provides the validity. 
The question is how rules can be influenced or created that are acceptable and at the same 
time allow a sustainable use of common-pool resources. Firstly, it has to be stated that the 
concept of sustainability as it is defined, for instance, in the Brundtland Report [6], was 
developed from the tradition of social justice, which was primarily moulded by Rawls. 
Secondly, the individual acceptance depends on individual goals. Most economists help 
themselves and simplify reality by assuming a homo oeconomicus. But as we have seen 
above, constitutional economics allows a broader view on the motivation of individual 
behaviour. Schramm [57] gives a systematic view on the different approaches on the extent to 
which individual behaviour is dominated by economic incentives or ethical considerations 
and states that there is no consensus on this in normative theories. 
This makes it difficult to step from a normative analysis to a positive one and it is no surprise 
that Voigt [63] concludes that there is not much research done in positive constitutional 
economics. However the comparison of alternative institutional arrangements requires a 
positive approach: “Comparing institutional analysis asks how alternative institutional 
arrangements effect (economic) outcomes.” [63, p.19]. This does not mean that only existing 
institutional arrangements can be compared but also possible arrangements with an empirical 
reference, as developed by laboratory settings. An essential element in such an empirical 
approach must be the evaluation of individual behaviour and the extent to which it is driven 
by economic incentives on the one hand and ethical considerations on the other. Without this 
knowledge the definition of complementary rules would be part of a trial-and-error process. 
Buchanan and Tullock [7] state that every individual will try to minimise his or her own costs 
in the choice of an institutional arrangement: “For a given activity the fully rational 
individualist, at the time of constitutional choice, will try to choose that decision-making rule 
which will minimize the present value of the expected costs that he must suffer.” [7, p.70]. 
This approach shows a clear emphasis of economic incentives in the individual’s action 
choice. Buchanan and Tullock limit this optimisation behaviour not only to material goods 
but include also immaterial effects and thereby explain institutional/constitutional aspects 
using economic mechanisms. The individual decision weighs up reduced possibilities and 
increased conditions. In later works Buchanan shifts from a position dominated by homo 
oeconomicus to a morally constrained one (bounded rationality). 
Buchanan and Yoon [8] state that there are three reasons for individuals to create rules. The 
first one is to reduce the temptation to behave how the individual feels they should not 
behave. The second reason is to reduce the complexity of the decision making process. The 
third reason is to “constrain collective actions that might be undertaken without the explicit 
consent of the individual who evaluates her role as a participant in post-constitutional 
politics.” [8]. This dynamic perspective gives a significant meaning to constituting the 
institutional arrangement from the individual perspective. An alternative approach is 
presented by Hayek [31, 32], who defines rules pertaining to institutions as a result of cultural 
evolution. The connection between the community level of (cultural) evolution and the level 
of individuals is obvious. Therefore we analyse in the following section learning mechanisms 
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on the individual’s level and interpret them as a driver for the evolution of rules at a 
community level. 
Evolution of rules refers to the incorporation of individual incentives (long-term and short-
term optimisation). On basis of their objectives individuals perceive their environment and 
changes to their environment and they learn to recognise particular elements, how these 
elements are connected and where the drivers are. Therefore, an applied model has to 
implement a context-specific learning mechanism. Learning can take place on an individual 
level or on a group level. 
The three elements Tesfatsion [61, p.292] lists point out two levels and, as the core point of 
this analysis, the link between the two of them. The agent adaptation is focused on the 
dynamics at an individual level. Learning incorporates the process of delivering the feedback 
from the system to the individual. The evolution of a system requires the analysis of drivers 
of a change of this system, for instance, the institutional arrangement. The latter point 
includes the feedback coming from the individual level because individual’s behaviour is a 
main driver for a change of the system. Young [67] puts his analysis of learning under the 
title “Individual Strategy and Social Structure” which describes the same levels. 
In reality this is an ongoing process of (1) signals perceived and processed by the individual 
and (2) feedback given to the system which is processed on that level and produces changes. 
Crucial for the application of agent-based models in real-world case studies is the definition 
of these two dynamic mechanisms. Before we discuss the possibilities to define mechanism 
(2) we will discuss different learning mechanisms, which defines point (1). 
Brenner [5] gives a comprehensive overview of learning in agent-based models. 
Young [67, pp.27-28] summarises the variety of learning mechanisms into four main groups. 
Natural selection describes an evolution where those agents with high payoffs have a higher 
population than those agents with low payoffs is modelled in so-called replicator dynamics. 
Imitation means that agents copy successful strategies of other agents and focuses obviously 
more on the agent’s decision making process than on natural selection. Regardless of other 
agents’ behaviour reinforcement dynamics are based on the agent’s own payoff. This 
mechanism defines the experience link between chosen strategy and the yielded payoff of an 
agent for their present strategy choice. The fourth learning mechanism is best reply in which 
the agent compares the outcome of different combinations of their own strategies with those 
of other agents in so-called fictitious plays. This mechanism implements very different 
approaches regarding how far the agent is able to forecast and process another’s strategies. 
 A B 
A 10/10 0/0 
B 0/0 1/1 
Fudenberg and Levine [25] give an overview of different mechanisms of so-called 
sophisticated learning mechanisms. An essential approach for our problem is the 
consideration of reputation. Reputation describes a mechanism where by past actions of an 
agent determine the expectation held by other agents. Additionally, reputation can describe a 
situation where one agent behaves myopic and the other agent has a competent understanding 
of the effects the strategies of both agents have on the system. 
The sophisticated agent will try to teach the other agent to choose strategy A, which 
maximises the payoff of both players. In a Stackelberg game A/A would be the solution for 
all periods if the rational player moves first. Fudenberg and Levine [25, pp.264-266] 
demonstrated that this outcome depends highly on the difference between the payoffs of A 
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and B and on the behaviour of the myopic agent. In a noisy environment – the myopic agent 
tends to randomise their strategy choice – it becomes reasonable that both agents behave myopic. 
The existence of a rational player simplifies the game and its learning mechanism. Kreps and 
Wilson [40] analyse a game with reputation and imperfect information. In a game where a 
possible entrant faces a monopolist and the entrant doesn’t know about the monopolist’s 
payoff function, beliefs become a function of the monopolist’s reputation. The equilibrium of 
the game highly depends highly on beliefs and Kreps and Wilson [40] show that solutions 
like the chain-store paradox1 [58] only appear when the reaction of the monopolist is defined 
as common knowledge. Under imperfect information other equilibria result. While Fudenberg 
and Levine [25] give a broad overview on existing learning mechanisms Chen and 
Khoroshilov [10] focus on learning under imperfect information. Their simulations show that 
the implementation of beliefs, like in experience-weighted attraction learning in Camerer and 
Ho [9], leads to less stability than in reinforcement models because the agents keep all 
strategies over all stages active. Camerer and Ho [9] formulate with their learning mechanism 
a bridge between fictitious games modified with weighted beliefs and reinforcement models. 
This approach defines the strategy choice as a function of expected payoffs. These expected 
payoffs depend on (1) the periodical payoff as a function of the own strategy and the 
strategies chosen by the other agents, and (2) the agent’s belief. This belief depends on the 
strategies, which the agent perceives other agents choose. 
Oechssler and Schipper [50, p.137] point out what Harsanyi [28, footnote 2] stated much 
earlier; there is far more extensive research done in the field of (learning with) imperfect 
information than (with) incomplete information2. Our problem falls into the category of 
incomplete information. 
With the goal of modelling real-world learning processes, some analyses try to find learning 
mechanisms for games with incomplete information and mixed strategies with the help of 
experiments. Such approaches look for patterns to describe dynamics in observed data. Erev 
and Roth [19] develop a reinforcement mechanism and combine it with forgetting and 
experimenting to explain changes in the strategy choice of agents. Sarin and Vahid [56] work 
on the same data as Erev and Roth [19] and develop a simple repeated game to explain the 
learning process. Oechssler and Schipper [50] collect their own data in experimental 
situations, focussing on the approach of Kalai and Lehrer [39] to define subjective Nash 
equilibria. In such a subjective view one agent can realise a single equilibrium while another 
agent perceives multiple equilibria. Following this approach, the main question is whether or 
not agents learn to perceive a game correctly. Their experiment compared the ability of agents 
to guess the payoff function of the other agent over the range of different games. Although this 
ability often does not seem to be very high, the games are close to Nash equilibrium. This is 
important for our problem as according to Aoki [3] a rule is established in form of equilibrium. 
Oechssler and Schipper [50] compare the reinforcement learning in Erev and Roth [19, pp.859-862] 
with that of Sarin and Vahid [56] and find that both describe their data reasonably well. 
In addition to learning about other agents, individuals learn by perceiving and processing effects 
of Nature. Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine [15] focus on learning about Nature’s moves and on 
the existence of equilibria. Modelling a real-world situation means that individual learning 
has to implement an agent’s own and others’ behaviour as well as Nature’s moves. Before an 
agent-based model will be specified the following section provides a game-theoretical base. 
RULES EVOLVE AND CONSTRAIN INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES 
In this section game theory is used to analyse institutional changes and to develop a 
quantitative method to formulate simulative capacity with which to evaluate policy decisions. 
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Game theory primarily uses the expression rules according to strategies. Every agent has an 
action choice that contains the different strategies the agent can choose from. 
Harsanyi [28] uses rules as a term for the model specifications, which comes close to the 
definitions given above. He uses rules to define the difference between games with complete 
and incomplete information: They differ “in the fact that some or all of the players lack full 
information about ‘rules’ of the game… For example, they may lack full information about 
other players’ or even their own payoff functions, about physical facilities available to other 
players or even themselves, about the amount of information the other players have about 
various aspects of the game situation, etc.”. Harsanyi [28] use of rules is on a different level 
to that of strategies and his rules correspond with those of other [12, 47]. 
By this definition, rules and norms are seen to be on a higher level than strategies as rules and 
norms are defined by a group rather than on an individual level. While a strategy can be 
“Pump 20 l/min” and another one “Pump 100 l/min” a rule has the form “No individual is 
allowed to pump more than 50 l/min at all times from aquifer X or else he gets fined by local 
police”. Formal and informal rules restrict the individual action choice. 
Crawford and Ostrom [13] define in their Grammar for institutions a general structure of 
rules for institutional statements. These are build out of the elements attributes, deontic, aim, 
conditions and or else. Their examples is (see [13, p.584]): 









at all times 
or else the village who 
owns the livestock will be 
levied a fine.” 
Mittenzwei and Bullock [44, p.10] add the enforcing mechanism as a sixth element: 





pay a reward 
r
2
 = ay+b 




or else the 
landlord has 
to pay a fine c 
being 
levied by a 
court.” 
These rules restrict the individual strategy choice, which leads to the question in Buchanan 
and Yoon [8] “Why do persons choose rules that seem to constrain or limit their choices?” If, 
for instance, the short-term optimising view of individuals has an ecological footprint, which 
does not conform to social preferences, institutional arrangements like rules will be formed to 
avoid unsustainable behaviour. Ostrom [53] structures rules in a very useful way, by stating 
that rules have to be seen in the context of (1) enforcement and (2) moral behaviour. 
Enforcement is the essential point Eggertsson [18] sees for individual behaviour. Harsanyi [29] 
delivers another useful definition of the two core drivers for incentives: “People’s behaviour 
can largely be explained in terms of two dominant interests: economic gain and social 
acceptance.” Fehr and Falk [20] point out the importance of the social approval of individual 
behaviour and stress the importance of feedback effects as the presence of approval motives 
may lead to permanent negative effects on rule compliance. Feige [21] and Leitzel [41] point 
out that formal rules can be perceived as bad rules. This maintains an essential dynamic 
because, as Aoki [3] states, changes in institutional arrangements are (merely) caused by 
disequilibria if incentives for individuals don’t match with formal (or informal) rules. This 
may lead to a process that changes the formal (or informal) rule. The institutional 
arrangement defines how this disequilibrium is solved, how the group level is transformed by 
the level of individuals. 
The three main questions are therefore: 
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 What preferences do individuals have? 
 How are these interests organised on a group level? 
 How are these rules enforced? 
The first question is in the domain of constitutional economics and was discussed in section 4. 
The second question refers to the process of formulating informal and formal rules, while the 
third question is concerned with the organisation of the rules’ enforcement. While we assume 
for this case that the enforcement of rules happens endogenously in a small system by social 
pressure and monitoring is not necessary, the following section focuses on the second point, 
the evolution of rules. 
MACRO LEVEL: SYSTEMS ADAPT BY EVOLVING RULES 
Games based on common-pool resources focus primarily on the users’ behaviour. Changes in 
behaviour are treated differently in game-theoretic literature. One scholar defines it as a 
dynamic game with incomplete information, and they analyse questions like moral 
reputation, moral hazard or signalling. The second scholar follows the biological 
interpretation of evolutionary games. Friedman [22, p.637] defines evolutionary games as 
games where “each individual chooses among alternative actions or behaviours whose payoff 
or fitness depends on the choice of others. Over time the distribution of observed behaviour 
in a population evolves, as fitter strategies become more prevalent.” 
The dissimilarity between the two approaches is expressed quite differently by a number of 
authors. Friedman [23, p.1] points out that “Strategic interactions over time can be modelled 
as an evolutionary game if the players do not systematically attempt to influence other 
players’ future actions and if the distribution of players’ action changes gradually.” However, 
Gintis [26, p.211] sees the difference in another perspective: While traditional game theory 
analyses, for instance, the fight between a predator and its prey, evolutionary game theory 
focuses on how predators “fight among themselves for the privilege of having their offspring 
occupy the predator niche in the next period and improve their chances by catching more 
prey.” In this sense the same game can be set up in an evolutionary way. As our main focus is 
institutions (equilibria) as an effect of changes in behaviour, Fudenberg and Tirole [24, p.28] 
give a relevant statement on the application of Nash equilibria: “It can be used to discuss the 
adjustment of population fractions by evolution as opposed to learning.” 
In our game with common-pool resources the rules evolve on a Meta level. As rules 
determine the availability of strategies the action choice evolves according to equilibria at the 
level of rules. While this Meta level is modelled in an evolutionary process the individuals 
change their knowledge, attitude and expectation in accordance with their learning. For this 
reason learning was discussed as an overview in section 4. In this section we will stay at the 
level of rules of the game. If the aim is to interpret equilibrium (as the outcome) of a game as 
an institution we have to acknowledge the existence of two different equilibrium concepts, 
the Nash equilibrium and the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). 
Other authors [42, 43] combine the mathematical approach with the biological perspective 
and develop an evolutionary concept of equilibria in games. Species have strategies in the 
form of their genotypic variants and in repeated, random pairing of players an (evolving) 
equilibrium results. Perturbations occur by mutations. A strategy (genotype) is evolutionary 
stable if the mutant cannot invade the species. Taylor and Jonker [60] proved that an ESS is 
sufficient for stability in dynamic games. Young [67, pp.44-65] discusses dynamic and 
stochastic stability of such equilibria and Gintis [26, p.150] provides the link to traditional 
(and modified) Nash equilibria: “A Nash equilibrium in an evolutionary game can consist of 
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a monomorphic population of agents, each playing the same mixed strategy, or as a 
polymorphic population, a fraction of the population playing each of the underlying pure 
strategies in proportion to its contribution to the mixed Nash strategy.” 
Friedman [23] analyses experimental results of equilibria in evolutionary games. He uses the 
Hawk-Dove game and confirms the assumed small group effect that agents will seldom try to 
influence the other agents’ behaviour. Kantian behaviour (behave how you expect others to 
behave – cooperative attitude) dominates games in groups with up to 6 persons playing 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. (At the same time this experiment shows when large games begin.) 
The discussion of equilibria leads to the core point of institution modelling. This step 
analyses the possibilities of interpreting equilibrium as a rule. While most of the work on 
institutional patterns assumes rules to be given (exogenously), game-theoretical approaches, 
especially the evolutionary field, focus on dynamic aspects of institutions and assume that 
rules are the result of behaviour. This means that a rule can be defined technically as 
equilibrium of the behaviour of different agents. Excellent introductions to the game-theoretic 
approach of institutional economics are in [3, 67]. 
Hurwicz [37] sets up a non-cooperative multi-stage game with a finite number of moves and 
n players and uses the resulting decision tree in the extensive form game to show how end 
nodes and branches can be used for institutional reasons. Branches can be used to analyse 
transaction costs, while end nodes demonstrate which moves result in a Nash equilibria. 
Mittenzwei and Bullock [44] build on this approach and set up a similar game, which they 
call Game with Institutions. In their approach an institution player exists and is dealt similar 
to Nature as a non-player. The game is defined on three levels: The first level is called 
institution forming, the second institution applying, and the third institution dependent. 
Players and Nature play on the first and third level, while the institution player plays 
(strategically) on the second level. An institution is presented as the strategy, the institution 
player makes their choice on the second level which then determines the action choice on the 
third level and therefore also (together with Nature’s move on level three) the players’ 
outcome. The location of the driver for the institution player and the strategies this non-player 
can choose from remain open. 
Aoki [3, p.10] characterises institutions as “a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs about a 
salient way in which a game is repeated.” With this approach he distinguishes between the 
equilibrium-of-the-game view, which is based on evolutionary game scholar, from the 
rules-of-the-game scholar (for instance [37]) which dominates the theory of New Institutional 
Economics described above. 
Aoki [3] visualises this evolutionary approach by Figure 1. Institutions are constituted by 
beliefs of agents and are (partially) coordinated by summary representations. Summary 
representations stand for compressed information which agents take as given. On the basis of 
these beliefs the agents chose their strategies, in other words, the strategies are constrained by 
the beliefs. Jointly the strategies of all agents constitute equilibrium. This equilibrium of 
agreed strategies confirms the summary representation (compressed information). 


































In this process the equilibrium paths themselves reaffirm the compressed information 
*
, 
which reproduces the institution. In this dynamic the institution becomes self-sustaining on Ê. 


















Figure 1. Game-theoretical approach to systemise institutions, see [3]. 
The agents have no direct control over institutions. The summary representation 
(compressed information) coordinates the agents’ expectations and helps them to find the 
‘corresponding’ strategy (action choice). 
But what if the results of each game are not in accordance with expectations? This can occur 
as a result of external shifts such as technological innovations, environmental threats, by internal 
cumulative issues from distribution effects (eg. power, assets) or mutant strategies. Aoki uses 
this argument to differentiate the subject cognition (which defines the subjective stage of the 
game) from the general cognition. If enough expectations differ from the games’ result it is 
possible to get a general cognitive disequilibrium. Such disequilibrium instigates the search 
for new strategies. These new strategies are in contradictory to the shared beliefs and through 
this learning process, new institutions are developed based on subjective game models. 
SPECIFICATION AND SCENARIOS OF THE AGENT-BASED MODEL 
Based on the evolutionary game-theoretical approach, in this section I develop a model for 
the context of CPR and multiple use issues. In order to develop simulative capacity for a real-
world situation I do not describe the decision making process by differential equations – see 
for this area of game-theory Fudenberg and Tirole [24, p.521] or Gintis [26, pp.164-187] but 
as an agent-based (or rule-based) approach. 
Agent-based models (ABM) or agent-based computational economics (ACE) allow analysis of 
“evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents” [61, p.281]. As Deadman [14, pp.161-162] 
points out, ABM defines a bottom-up approach and instead of defining the overall behaviour 
“this overall behaviour emerges as a result of the actions and interactions of the individual 
agents.” The modeller defines the initial conditions of the game, which includes, for instance, 
how many agents exist in the first period, and how much of a common-pool resource is available. 
Critical for the specification is the definition of strategies for each of the agents (action choice) 
as well as the if-then conditions. “The result is a complicated dynamic system of recurrent 
causal chains connecting agents’ behaviours, interaction networks, and social welfare 
outcomes.” [61, p.1]. In-depth descriptions of ABM can be found in, for instance, [34, 35]. 
In this approach I will apply an agent-based model to mimic the evolution of rules as 
institutions and include the context of multiple use. Crucial for the problem are the 
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mechanisms that drive the dynamics of the system, which includes the common-pool resource. 
Tesfatsion [61, p.292] raises in this context an important question: “How should agent 
adaptation, learning, and evolution be constructively represented in these artificial economic 
worlds?” The previous sections were focused on these three elements placed on two levels. 
The following part defines an agent-based model for an applied common-pool problem. 
As I focus the modelling exercise on multiple-use issues in combination with a common-pool 
dilemma I have to include diverging interests in the use of one resource. In this case I assume 
one rancher in Australia’s outback who leases his land and makes his decision on how much 
cattle he puts on the paddock, a decision that depends on expected rainfall. Additionally, I 
assume that on the land he leases there is a gorge with an important fossil site, which several 
national and international archaeologists try to preserve. 
The multiple-use issue is extended by another dimension by considering tourists approaching 
the land for four-wheel-driving, a famous activity in outback Australia. Several groups of 
tourists access the land without the permission of the rancher. As the tourists are perceived as 
creating additional income in the local community a very vocal part of the community has an 
interest in an increasing number of tourists visiting the area. The problem is that uncontrolled 
four-wheel driving is likely to cause significant damage to the fossil sites. Additionally, four-
wheel driving happens mostly in the mud regions around the gorge, which scares the cattle 
away and reduces the productivity and, therefore, the income of the rancher. It is obvious that 
(uncontrolled) four-wheel driving is not in the interest of the rancher. 
The question is how the community of interest organises its individual interests on a 
community level and how the rules organising the system evolve on the background of 
multiple use opportunities. In the case described above two main CPR can be identified. First, 
the archaeological site that is used by different groups, archaeologists for research, the public 
just by knowing it exists, and the four-wheel drivers as part of the ideal driving area. 
Secondly, is the pool of potential tourists a CPR, in order to allow the community to increase 
its income and to allow the rancher to protect his land from decreasing productivity.  






 and j = 1, …, m. In a 
multi-stage game the agents move simultaneously (normal form game). The two main control 
variables in the action choice of the agent rancher is ‘fencing’ FC
t
 and ‘number of cattle’ 
NOC
t
. The rancher starts with ‘no fencing’ as fencing and the emplacement of locked gates is 
linked with significant annual costs of $ 2000. The rancher has to decide before the start of 
the wet season on the number of cattle. The decision is based on last year’s rainfall. I assume 
an indicator t for rainfall, which goes from 0 (no rain) to 1500 (heavy rainfalls). It is 
common knowledge that the block of land of this rancher can carry a livestock of 600 cattle 
at an average rainfall. The rancher needs a minimum livestock of 200 cattle to secure a 
minimal income. Therefore the rancher will put a livestock of 200 on the paddock even 
expecting a very dry year. Additionally, I assume that even in very wet years the paddocks 
cannot carry more than 1000 cattle. 
A significant influence for the condition of cattle is their access to the gorge. I assume that 
NOC not only represents the number of cattle but includes also an average weight, which is 
important for the profit function later on. Four-wheel drivers that drive along the gorge 
without caring about cattle scare the cattle away. Therefore, the weather-dependent term is 
multiplied by a ratio that represents the impact of uncontrolled four-wheel driving UWD
t
. 
This multiplier assumes that the higher the level of UWD
t
 is the more of the maximal impact 
 decreases NOCt. I assume for these simulations a maximal impact of  = 0,5. This means 
that even if UWD
t
 doubles over time it can reduce the condition of livestock by 50 %. On the 
other extreme, if UWD
t
 is zero, the cattle is not impacted at all. 
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The fossil site is the common-pool resource t. Its condition depends highly on the amount of 
four-wheel drivers frequenting the gorge. One type of driver has higher priorities in 
preserving the site and drives responsibly, the other type values the driving much higher and 
does not care or does not know about the damage of driving. Lets assume there are 1000 
drivers and 90 % of them belonging to the group of irresponsible drivers that do not control 
where they drive, UWD
t
. Ten percent of the tourists control their driving to preserve the fossil 
site in the gorge, CWD
t
. I assume that both types of drivers are part of a potential pool of 
tourists. This pool is increasing as there is a rising interest in four-wheel driving and as that 
site becomes more and more famous for good four-wheel driving. The following discrete 





 + 10t  with NTO
1
 = 1000. 
As four-wheel driving is more exciting with higher rainfall t the actual number of drivers on 
the paddock varies with rainfall and follows, additionally, the main path of the potential tourists. 
 7509,0/ 11111   ttt qNTONTOUWDUWD , 
 7501,0/ 11111   ttt qNTONTOCWDCWD . 
The difference between dry and wet years is important but to smoothen the amplitude of 
these reaction functions I assume q = 0,5. 
The condition is that the fossil site decreases as the more uncontrolled four-wheel driving 
UWD
t
 happens. As this condition is not reversible the site has to be modelled as a non-
renewable resource. I assume the following linear function: 
400/11   ttt UWD  with   10001  . 
The rancher’s profit is defined by the following function: 
t = NOCt600. 
This means that the rancher can get an average price of $ 600 per cattle. 
It is obvious that UWD
t
 has an impact on NOC
t
 and therefore on t. First scenario assumes the 
rancher does not realise this impact, which means that no learning takes place. In such a scenario 
80 % of the fossil site would be destroyed after 40 years. Figure 2 (a) shows the decline in the 
grey area. The columns present the stochastic influence t, the light grey line on the bottom 
the number of CWD
t
 and the white spotted black line on the top UWD
t





 have each increased by 40 %. Figure 2b shows the periodical pay-off of the 
rancher (grey line) and the rainfall (columns). The range in which the weather dependent 

































Figure 2. Results for scenario 1. a) Indices for condition of fossil site (FSS), controlled four-wheel 
driving (CWD), and uncontrolled four-wheel driving (UWD) and rainfall, b) profit for rancher in $ 
1000 and rainfall. 
One of the main interests of this paper is the effect of knowledge on the evolution of rules. 
Therefore, in the next step knowledge is implemented. At the beginning of every period the 
rancher observes the payoff of the last move t and Nature’s move t-1. Additionally, the 
rancher perceives tourists driving on his paddock mostly around the gorge that scares the 
cattle away. His attitude towards four-wheel driving starts as being neutral. But he learns as 
he identifies the pattern 
 Unprotected gorge means 
 more four-wheel drivers means 
 less productive cattle means 
 less profit 
The implementation of reinforcement dynamics shows the rancher that his strategy choice ‘no 
locked gates’ has a negative impact on his pay-off. In other words, the rancher realises that 
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today’s fencing decision has an impact on tomorrow’s pay-off. I assume that the rancher has 
to identify this pattern three times to become active. The moment the rancher realises the 
reduced productivity is caused by the four-wheel drivers, he starts installing locked gates, 
which takes him one period. Another reason for a decrease in production can also be the 
difference between expected rain and actual rainfall. Technically, the rancher accumulates 
knowledge points for each identified pattern. Costs for additional fencing, gates and locks for 
the rancher are $ 2000 per period. We assume that even this fencing strategy can just reduce 
UWD
t




 both parties 
decrease by 40 %. 
This reinforcement learning takes part on the individual level of the rancher and it helps 
increasing the profit over 40 years by another $ 2089. 
Assuming that the strategy locked gates is able to reduce the overall driving by 40 %, for the 
community this means that 40 % less tourists visit the area and spend their money in local 
shops and restaurants. In the third scenario we assume that also this agent (a vocal part of the 
community) learns about this link and identifies the pattern: 
 Fenced property of the rancher means 
 less tourists means 
 less community income. 
At the same time a third agent represents the local interest in preserving the fossils and they 
learn about the pattern: 
 Fenced property of the rancher means 
 less tourists means 
 better protected fossils. 
In this third scenario all three agents start learning based on their patterns. In the moment 
they accumulated their knowledge (again three identified cases to realise the pattern) the 
agents communicate their interests on the community level. According to Aoki [3], the agents 
signal disequilibrium. In terms of institutional arrangements a bottom-up process is initiated 
that leads to a formulation of a new rule, in this case an informal rule. 
To explain the general approach of this paper this essential step from individual learning to 
evolving rules has to be developed: As a result of (best reply) learning, agent i may want to 
influence other agents’ behaviour whose strategy choice has a negative externalities on i’s 
future payoff, like the rancher’s strategy reduces the communities income. One option is to 
influence the other agent in the form of reputation (see above). Let us assume that there are 
three agents. Essential for their strategy choice are their expectations, attitude and knowledge. 
Expectations are implemented as a set of beliefs i
t
, which are subjective and can change in 









(t, NTOt, FSSt, sj
t
). 
Attitude i is a long-term element with important meaning for the dynamics and we assume 
that it will not change in time (and therefore has to be treated as a parameter). This 
assumption implements path dependency – see [45, 49] – in such ways that knowledge does 
not change the behaviour immediately, but includes attitudes as slow moving (in this case 































Figure 3. Results for scenario 2. a) Indices for condition of fossil site (FSS), controlled four-wheel 
driving (CWD), and uncontrolled four-wheel driving (UWD) and rainfall; b) profit for rancher in $ 
1000 and rainfall. 
The essential influence of attitude is in the perception of new information. New information 
might be accepted as correct but if the agent’s goal is, for instance, connected with a hit-and-
run strategy, any information about long-term effects might be ignored if the agent’s utility 
function contains only profit. Section 4 discusses the importance of economic indicators for 
individual behaviour. Another way to distinguish the agents for their attitude towards 
sustainable development is the implementation of different discount rates. A green agent will 
discount future payoff by a much lower rate than other agents. In a differential approach this 
leads to a higher extraction rate of an unsustainable agent. 
Individual knowledge is driven by the perception of new information in a learning process and 












). From this point on we can 









Figure 4 shows the general approach of this paper. 
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In this approach every agent is described by its’ knowledge, attitude and expectation. Agents 
can choose from a set of strategies (action choice) and behave in a certain way. This 
behaviour is interfered by Nature’s move. The net result of all n behaviours and Nature’s 
move determines the equilibrium of the play. We interpret this equilibrium as a rule (formal 
or informal) or a norm. The payoff leads, in connection with observed behaviour of other 
agents, Nature’s move and the change in common-pool resource, to a particular expectation 
of future possibilities of strategy choices. The agents learn that the condition of the common-
pool resource (e.g. fossil site) can restrict strategy choices (e.g. attract fossil interested 
tourists) and this restriction can lead to a long-term degradation of payoffs (e.g. fossils 
destroyed). In this instance the agent and other respective players may disagree with what is 
expected (depends on the attitude) resulting in a disequilibrium. Technically, this agent flags 
his/her discontent and if the majority is dissatisfied with their subjective expectations the rule 
will be changed. This means the strategy choice of all agents receives new boundaries and 
one or more strategies can fall out of the action choice or become modified. 
The modification can be modelled in different ways. The appropriate approach would be to 
let the agents develop their own rules as is discussed in section 6. If the common-pool 
resource was a fossil site the agents should, for instance, think about changing rules in terms 
of allowing access to this site. For such an approach the agents would have to negotiate the 

































Figure 4. Agent-based conceptualisation. 
changing their strategy choice. Such an approach is unlikely to occur if there are no 
predefined elements of choice in order to build rules. This leads to the second option, which 
defines different sleeping elements agents can activate and deactivate. In a more sophisticated 
manner, sleeping elements can approximate the eligible definition. Agents can experiment 
with different techniques such as bringing new agents into the game or using methods to 
regulate the use of the common-pool resource. This means that the learning process will 
include the application of different rule-specifying decisions in a best reply manner on the 


























Figure 5. Results for scenario 3. a) Indices for condition of fossil site (FSS), controlled four-wheel 
driving (CWD), and uncontrolled four-wheel driving (UWD) and rainfall, b) profit for rancher in 
$ 1000 and rainfall. 
Applying this conceptual model in the agent-based simulation means that the three agents 
flag if they are happy with the rancher’s strategy choice on the community level. Making the 
realistic assumption that the rancher wants to avoid any social isolation in the small 
community he is open for the enquiries. As the fossil loving part of the community backs the 
locked gates strategy the business part of the community tries to find a compromise. They 
realise that there is a difference between UWD and CWD. They convince the rancher and the 
fossil loving part of the community that CWD should not be kept off the property because 
they care about cattle and the fossils. The three parties realise the need for monitoring. The 
business part of the community organises a permit system with information material and 
posts them at the entries of the property. The effect is that the rancher can reduce UWD to 
45 drivers, which reduces the negative impact on the cattle productivity. 
Figure 5 (a) shows the first drop in UWD
t
 occurs in period 8. Five years in a row rainfall 
decreases, which distracts the learning process of the rancher. In period 8 the rancher starts 
putting locked gates in place that causes a reduction in tourists by 40 %. He does not 






. Between year 9 and 11 the community learns about the 





 drops to 45 drivers. At the end of the 40 years CWD
t
 varies around 250 
drivers. FSS
t
 remains at a level of 85,5 %. In comparison with scenario 2 the rancher’s profit 
increases by $ 1621 as UWD
t
 is further reduced. 
In scenario 4, a further dimension of institutional change is introduced. The number of 
potential tourists NTO
t
 for this area is constantly increasing and as the community creates a 
scarcity of accessible area, entrepreneurs are likely to identify this created scarcity, they learn 
about it on an individual level. This new agent offers the rancher to manage the permit 
system and to reduce UWD
t
 to maximal one driver. The tourism operator plans also to 
advertise the possibility of four-wheel driving to increase CWD
t
, an argument for the 
negotiation with the community. The tourism operator expects to attract at least 250 tourists. 
As this is also for the benefit of the community the tourism operator wants the community to 
cover 40 % of the total costs of $ 10 000. As UWD
t
 will be reduced to maximal one driver the 
rancher shall cover another $ 1000. The tourism operator who charges a driving fee of $ 30 
shall cover the remaining $ 5000. 
Realistically, such a fee will make CWD
t
 more volatile, q = 1. On the other side, I assume 
that advertisement can attract up to 60 % more CWD
t
 . This scenario is focused on the effect 
of Nature’s move on the evolution of rules. 
Figure 6 shows that in comparison with scenario 3 the first 15 years remain unchanged: The 
rancher learns first and locks the gates, which has an impact on the benefit of the community 
(positive in terms of preservation and negative in terms of income), the community offers 
another solution and the community follows a new rule. This restriction – and the high 
difference between demand and supply of drive sites – initiates a learning process of a new 
entrepreneur, starting in year 13. Negotiations start in year 15 and in the following year the 
new arrangement becomes active. In this period   climbs up to nearly 500. But for a row of 
dry years the tourism operator pulls out as he starts making losses. In year 20 the old regime 
returns and the community manages the access for four-wheel drivers without charging. In 
the following two years a new entrepreneur gets attracted and negotiations start again. This 
management holds for another three years before it breaks down again for six years. 
Such a change in management of four-wheel driving is very common in outback Australia 
and is, as modelled, weather dependent. This flexible change in rules leads just to a marginal 
increase of profit for the rancher. But at the same time the number of CWD
t
 increases for the 
whole 40 years by 70 %. FSS
t
 decreases, like in scenario 3, in the first 11 years to 85,5 % and 
remains afterwards at this level. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper targeted the implementation of multiple-use issues in the context of common-pool 
resources and analysed the capability of agent-based approaches to model such scenarios. 
Therefore, this paper developed from the basis of institutional economics and game theory, a 
concept to model the evolution of institutions endogenously in an agent-based model. 
Firstly, the paper shows that agent-based models can be applied to real-world cases of 
common-pool resources. Secondly, multiple-use issues are modelled against the background 
of common-pool resources and it is shown that different uses can help protecting common-
pool resources, given institutions are able to adapt. 
This paper provides the methodological foundation for the endogenous simulation of evolving 


























Figure 6. Results for scenario 4. a) Indices for condition of fossil site (FSS), controlled four-wheel 
driving (CWD), and uncontrolled four-wheel driving (UWD) and rainfall, b) profit for rancher in 
$ 1000 and rainfall. 
REMARKS 
1The chain-store paradox describes the game between a monopolist and an entrant. Assumed 
that fighting the entrant is combined with negative payoff, the monopolist will not fight in the 
last stage of a finite multi-stage game. Rolling backwards this argument is valid for every 
stage of the game and the monopolist does not fight the entrant and the entrant enters [58]. 
2“The distinction between games with complete and incomplete information (between 
C-games and I-games) must not be confused with that between games with perfect and 
imperfect information. By common terminology convention, the first distinction always 
refers to the amount of information the players have about the rules of the game, while the 
second refers to the amount of information they have about the other players’ and their own 
previous moves (and about previous chance moves).” [28, FN2]. 
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Modeliranje evoluiranja pravila uporabe zajedničkih 
resursa u modelu temeljenom na agentima 
A. Smajgl 
 Održivi ekosustavi, Commonwealthova organizacija za znanstvena i industrijska istraživanja 
 Townsville, Australija 
SAŽETAK 
Institucionalni postav ključni je pokretač uporabe zajedničkih resursa. Analiza postojećeg postava zahtijeva 
okvir koji u istraživanju omogućava sustavni opis slučajeva i dijagnosticiranje institucionalnog sklopa. Na 
temelju razumijevanja postojećih institucija pitanje koji su učinci alternativnog postava postaje jasno. 
Odgovarajući korak traži prediktivni model, bilo kvalitativni bilo – što se i preporuča – onaj koji analizira 
emprijske podatke kvantitativno. Suštinski konceptualni izazov kvantitativnog modela je evolucija pravila koja 
određuju granice unutar kojih agenti određuju strategije. Ovaj članak razvija temelje koncepta odgovarajućeg 
pristupa modeliranju i model temeljen na agentima za analizu institucionalnog postava zejdničkih resursa. 
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